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Abstract
Even though a main goal of science is to reduce the uncertainty in scientific results by applying ever-improving research
methods, epistemic uncertainty is an integral part of science. As such, while uncertainty might be communicated in news
articles about climate science, climate skeptics have also exploited this uncertainty to cast doubt on science itself. We per-
formed two studies to assess whether scientific uncertainty affects laypeople’s assessments of issue uncertainty, the cred-
ibility of the information, their trust in scientists and climate science, and impacts their decision-making. In addition, we
addressed how these effects are influenced by further information on relevant scientific processes, because knowing that
uncertainty goes along with scientific research could ease laypeople’s interpretations of uncertainty around evidence and
may even protect against negative impacts of such uncertainty on trust. Unexpectedly, in study 1, after participants read
both a text about research methods and a news article that included scientific uncertainty, they had lower trust in the
scientists’ assertions than when they read the uncertain news article alone (but this did not impact trust in climate science
or decision-making). In study 2, we tested whether these results occurred due to participants overestimating the scien-
tific uncertainty at hand. Hence, we varied the framing of uncertainty in the text on scientific processes. We found that
exaggerating the scientific uncertainty produced by scientific processes (vs. framing the uncertainty as something to be
expected) did not negatively affect participants’ trust ratings. However, the degree to which participants preferred effort-
ful reasoning on problems (intellective epistemic style) correlated with ratings of trust in scientists and climate science
and with their decision-making. In sum, there was only little evidence that the introduction of uncertainty in news articles
would affect participants’ ratings of trust and their decision-making, but their preferred style of reasoning did.
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1. Introduction
Scientific uncertainty is defined as “lack of scientific
knowledge, or disagreement over the knowledge that
currently exists” (Friedman, Dunwoody, & Rogers, 2012,
p. xiii). While scientific processes are continuously op-
timized to allow only limited uncertainty, uncertainty
remains an immediate outcome of scientific research
(Friedman et al., 2012). Consequently, there has been
debate in science communication research and prac-
tice about how and to what effect uncertainty may be
communicated. Research suggests that communicated
uncertainty might lead to adverse reactions by recipi-
ents (see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,
and Medicine, 2017). Also, uncertainty has been uti-
lized tomanufacture doubt about climate science among
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the general public (Freudenburg, Gramling, & Davidson,
2008; Lewandowsky, Ballard, & Pancost, 2015; Oreskes,
2015; Oreskes & Conway, 2011). However, it has also
been argued that transparency about uncertainty in
scientific information might enhance public trust, as
long as it is not overemphasized (e.g., Druckman, 2015;
Zehr, 2017).
In digital media (e.g., social media and blogs), un-
certainty is often expressed and explicitly discussed
(Dunwoody, Hendriks, Massarani, & Peters, 2018), but
it might also be exploited by climate skeptics to fuel
their online attacks. In fact, a number of studies investi-
gating climate-skeptical blogs ascertain that blog entries
and comments often challenge scientific data and meth-
ods in order to establish the notion there is an active
scientific controversy around climate change (Elgesem,
Steskal, & Diakopoulos, 2015;Matthews, 2015; Sharman,
2014). Mercer (2018) concluded that climate skeptics
may use appeals to Popper’s philosophy (e.g., whether
claims of climate science are falsifiable) to deconstruct
climate science arguments.
In such a context, we conducted two studies to inves-
tigate how the communication of scientific uncertainty
within news articles about climate science affects partic-
ipants’ assessment of uncertainty surrounding an issue
and their trust in climate researchers and climate science.
In the first study, because the scientific processes might
act as a source of uncertainty but also as a way to resolve
it, we investigated whether reading about scientific pro-
cesses before reading news articles on climate science
might mitigate the effect that communicated scientific
uncertainty may have on participants’ judgments about
issue uncertainty and trust. In the second study, we ex-
tend our results by varying how we introduced the scien-
tific processes. We introduced them either by emphasiz-
ing that scientific processes are optimized to achieve as
much scientific certainty as possible or by exaggerating
the scientific uncertainty inherent in science (as climate
skeptics might do in digital media).
1.1. Scientific Uncertainty
While some uncertainty cannot be resolved (e.g., knowl-
edge about the future), the term ‘epistemic uncertainty’
pertains to unknowns that can be resolved, at least in
theory. Sources of epistemic uncertainty often lie within
scientific processes (van der Bles et al., 2019; Walker,
1991). Even though processes and methods are continu-
ously optimized to limit uncertainty, there is always some
level of specification that cannot be reached. Walker
(1991) prepared a taxonomy of such sources of uncer-
tainty, applicable to a variety of empirical scientific disci-
plines: When designing research, conceptual uncertainty
is present in the choice and conceptual definition of vari-
ables. Then, measurement uncertainty arises as related
to how consistent and how accurate measurements are.
Processes of generalization involve sampling uncertainty,
whereas modeling uncertainty refers to errors in esti-
mating mathematical relationships between variables.
Next, causal uncertainty arises from the possibility of
making false assumptions about a variable’s causal rela-
tionship. Finally, Walker’s taxonomy also includes uncer-
tainty stemming from false use or assumptions of knowl-
edge or underlying theories, which may influence all the
other types of uncertainty. Following an extensive re-
view of conceptualizations of scientific uncertainty and
empirical evidence, van der Bles et al. (2019) added an-
other source of scientific uncertainty: expert disagree-
ment. Expert disagreement may arise when empirical re-
sults are new, not yet replicated, or conflicting, but also
when experts have not (yet) reached consensus over ac-
cumulated evidence (see Oreskes, 2007; Zehr, 2017).
In this article, we refer to scientific uncertainty,
which pertains to the status of evidence (but not uncer-
tainty around facts or numbers; for a recent study, see
van der Bles, van der Linden, Freeman, & Spiegelhalter,
2020), and we use Walker’s conceptualization to de-
scribe howwemanipulated scientific uncertainty in both
studies. In study 1, in the news article participants
read we included measurement, sampling, and model-
ing uncertainty around evidence on the effect of cli-
mate change on ocean life; in study 2, we further intro-
duced participants to the uncertainty resulting from ex-
pert disagreement.
1.2. Trust and Decision-Making
Scientific uncertainty is directly linked to trust in sci-
ence. While scientific knowledge is inherently uncer-
tain and complex, this also means that a full under-
standing of scientific claims and evidence is not feasi-
ble for laypeople, resulting in a bounded understand-
ing of science (Bromme & Goldman, 2014). To overcome
this bounded understanding, laypeople have to defer to
and depend on expert knowledge (Bromme & Goldman,
2014; Schäfer, 2016), but this does not mean they are
gullible (Sperber et al., 2010). Instead, they build trust
through heuristically and systematically evaluating infor-
mation and information sources (Hendriks & Kienhues,
2019). In trustworthiness evaluations of experts, three di-
mensions are recognized: an expert’s expertise, integrity
and benevolence (Hendriks, Kienhues, & Bromme, 2015).
Further, because people likely make similar evaluations
of scientific experts and their corresponding scientific
communities, people might evaluate whether experts of
a particular domain hold and share expertise, follow es-
tablished and acceptable norms, and act with a general
goodwill toward society.
Many studies have investigated the relationship be-
tween communicated scientific uncertainty and trust in
science or scientists, and results are contradictory. This
might be because different studies operationalized the
communicated uncertainty differently, e.g., as distribu-
tions, ranges, or verbal statements, or because different
studies evaluated different sources of uncertainty. In the
context of our work, below we only describe studies—
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separately for different dependent variables—that have
examined the influence of verbal statements about sci-
entific uncertainty on trust in science or scientists (for a
complete review, see van der Bles et al., 2019).
First, some studies have investigated how trustwor-
thy scientists or journalists are perceived to be as infor-
mation sources when they communicate scientific un-
certainty. Gustafson and Rice (2019) found that when
they included uncertainty frames related to consen-
sus (i.e., experts disagree) in scientific information on
climate change, this lowered the perceived credibility
of the source compared to a control condition; con-
versely, other scientific uncertainty frames (e.g., refer-
ring to unknownswithin future research) did not. Further,
Jensen (2008) found that when disclosed uncertainty
was attributed to an article’s primary scientist, this en-
hanced the primary scientist’s perceived trustworthiness
(here: honesty and transparency) and that of the ar-
ticle’s author (journalist). In a later study, this finding
was only replicated for journalists’ credibility but not
for that of scientists (Ratcliff, Jensen, Christy, Crossley, &
Krakow, 2018).
Second, other studies have investigated how trust in
a particular scientific discipline is affectedwhen scientific
uncertainty is disclosed. For example, when an article de-
scribes the limitations (vs. recent advances) of research
in a scientific field, the field is perceived to be less pre-
cise and less simple (and more so by Republicans than
Democrats in a US sample; Broomell & Kane, 2017). In
another study, introducing scientific uncertainty and lim-
itations in news articles about cancer research did not
increase trust in the medical profession, but introducing
more experts in the articlemay have (Jensen et al., 2011).
Third, some studies have investigated whether
scientific uncertainty affects laypeople’s internal
uncertainty—their psychological experience of uncer-
tainty (Peters & Dunwoody, 2016; van der Bles et al.,
2019)—which might manifest in people’s decision-
making (e.g., Han, Moser, & Klein, 2007). In one study,
messages that included uncertainty did result in par-
ticipants giving higher ratings on the objectivity and
balance of the journalistic reporting (about a vaccine),
but it lowered participants’ ease of decision-making
(Westphal, Hendriks, & Malik, 2015). Two other stud-
ies used the following variation: Uncertainty was intro-
duced either via lexical hedges (e.g., ‘probably’) or by
referring to other experts. In one study, hedging led par-
ticipants to more easily make decisions about a health
issue (Mayweg-Paus & Jucks, 2015), while in the other
study, hedging in texts about an educational issue led to
participants to give lower ratings on argument credibility
and ‘scientific-ness’ of the text (Thiebach, Mayweg-Paus,
& Jucks, 2015).
Taken together, the results on how uncertainty af-
fects laypeople’s trust and decision-making are rather
inconclusive. Thus, here we investigated whether scien-
tific uncertainty (pertaining to the state of evidence) in
news articles affects participants’ assessment of uncer-
tainty in the research field and affects their trust in as-
sertions made by climate scientists and their trust in cli-
mate science itself. Furthermore, we assessed whether
being facedwith scientific uncertainty led participants to
havemore uncertainty whenmaking decisions related to
the issue.
1.3. Knowledge about Scientific Processes
As mentioned above, in science’s endeavor to narrow in
on the ‘truth,’ scientific processes are continuously aug-
mented tominimize uncertainty. However, the degree to
which laypeople understand such aspects about science
is central to their scientific literacy. In newer conceptions
of the term, scientific literacy entails not only content
knowledge (knowing a set of facts about science) but
also procedural and epistemic knowledge (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017).
Procedural knowledge means being aware of the main
methods of empirical enquiry, as well as the scientific
uncertainty that comes alongwith them,while epistemic
knowledge entails, for example, understanding why such
methods are used.
In this context, one open question some studies have
considered is how someone’s knowledge about scien-
tific processes might affect their interpretation of sci-
entific uncertainty. In a large survey study, people who
had higher knowledge about scientific methods were
alsomore aware of uncertainty within science (Retzbach,
Otto, & Maier, 2016). In a qualitative study, participants
accepted uncertainty if they also believed that uncer-
tainty is intrinsic to science (Maxim & Mansier, 2014).
Similarly, in an experimental study, Kimmerle, Flemming,
Feinkohl, and Cress (2015) found that participants who
believed science to be uncertain tended to perceive
higher scientific uncertainty in news reports. Along these
lines, when Rabinovich and Morton (2012) encouraged
participants to believe that science is a debate (vs. the
search for a single truth), they were more motivated to
behave sustainably. Further, Flemming, Kimmerle, Cress,
and Sinatra (2020) were able to reduce the negative ef-
fects of scientific uncertainty on ratings of credibility by
introducing participants to the role of scientific uncer-
tainty in research using a refutation text. All these results
are in line with the theoretical and empirically tested
idea (Gauchat, 2011) that the general public’s trust in sci-
ence is related to believing that scientific processes (‘the
scientific method’) culturally demarcate scientific knowl-
edge from other types of knowledge.
Given the above findings, we assumed for our studies
that if, along with a text discussing the scientific uncer-
tainties of a particular issue, participants were also given
information about the direct source of the uncertainty—
namely, the associated scientific research methods—
this might make them more trustful and allow them to
more easily make decisions. For example, it is possible
that when participants are informed that scientific mod-
els are based on data and are continuously improved,
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they may be able to explain and partially resolve mod-
eling uncertainty.
2. Study 1
Overall, the empirical research is inconclusive on how
communicated uncertainty affects laypeople (van der
Bles et al., 2019). Specifically, it is still unclear how com-
municated scientific uncertainty affects laypeople’s judg-
ments of the credibility ofmessages and their overall trust
in scientists and scientific disciplines. To explore these re-
search questions further, we designed an experimental
study with a two-factorial design. Scientific uncertainty
was varied by introducing scientific uncertainty in a fic-
titious newspaper article on how climate change affects
ocean life. This text was presented to two experimental
groups (scientific uncertainty conditions). The other two
groups (non-scientific uncertainty conditions) read the
same text, but the information was presented as certain
(e.g., ‘later studies found similar results’). Furthermore, in
order to enhance participants’ abilities to evaluate scien-
tific uncertainty, we aimed to activate participants’ rele-
vant knowledge about sources of uncertainty. Hence, em-
pirical research methods (which were directly applicable
to the uncertainty mentioned in the news article text)
were presented to two groups (empirical research meth-
ods conditions) before they read the newspaper article
with/without scientific uncertainty; the other two groups
(non-empirical research methods conditions) read texts
on media coverage about climate change.
We investigated whether being exposed to scientific
uncertainty (scientific uncertainty conditions) and/or
learning about empirical researchmethods (empirical re-
search methods conditions) affected participants’ (1) as-
sessment of the issue uncertainty, (2) perception of the
article’s credibility, (3) trust in the scientists’ assertions
and trust in climate science, and (4) ease with which
they were able to reach a personal decision on the is-
sue. We expected that communicating scientific uncer-
tainty to participants would increase their perception of
the issue uncertainty and decrease their ease of making
a decision but also increase their trust in scientists (e.g.,
Jensen, 2008; Rabinovich&Morton, 2012) and in climate
science in general:
H1: In the scientific uncertainty conditions, rat-
ings of issue uncertainty are higher, and ratings of
decision-making ease are lower, compared to the non-
scientific uncertainty conditions (main effect).
H2: In the scientific uncertainty conditions, ratings of
information credibility and trust in climate scientists
and climate science are higher, compared to the non-
scientific uncertainty conditions (main effect).
We furthermore expected that providing participants
with information about empirical research methods
might enhance their trust in climate scientists and in
climate science, as similar research found that intro-
ducing participants to the unavoidability of uncertainty
in science increased credibility and trust ratings (e.g.,
Flemming et al., 2020).
H3: In the empirical research methods conditions, rat-
ings of trust in climate scientists and climate science
are higher, compared to the non-empirical research
methods conditions (main effect).
H4: In the empirical research methods conditions,
ratings of decision-making ease are higher, espe-
cially for the scientific uncertainty condition (interac-
tion effect).
2.1. Methods
For experimental materials and measures, see the
Supplementary File. This study was preregistered
(Hendriks, Ilse, & Jucks, 2017). We conducted a power
analysis to calculate the sample size needed to detect a
small effect of partial eta square of .01 with a power of
.95 and an alpha of .05, using G*power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The determined sample size
was 175.
2.1.1. Sample
We recruited university students via open Facebook
groups and a university newsletter, resulting in N = 286
participants who finished the questionnaire and con-
sented to data usage. After excluding those who had
studied at an (applied) university for more than two
semesters and those who used a mobile phone to com-
plete the questionnaire, wewere left withN= 207 partic-
ipants. Those participants were between 18 and 41 years
of age (M = 20.34; SD = 2.56), and 63.8% were female,
33.8%male, and 2.4% chose not to disclose their gender.
Most (60.4%) majored in social sciences, economics, or
law; 13.0% in science, technology, engineering e mathe-
matics; 11.6% in the arts; the remaining 25% in health,
nutrition or sports. One participant had not studied at a
college/university.
2.1.2. Procedure and Measures
After giving information about participating in the study,
we presented participantswith demographical questions
(age, gender, education). Next, we had them read the
two texts: First, participants read about research meth-
ods (experimental methods and mathematical models)
ormedia coverage on climate change (empirical research
methods versus non-empirical research methods con-
ditions), and then they read about ocean acidification
with/without uncertainty (resulting from comparing lab
and field experiments, frommaking generalizations, and
frommaking predictions frommathematical models; sci-
entific uncertainty versus non-scientific uncertainty con-
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ditions). The experimental groups were randomly se-
lected by the survey software, leaving n = 51 in the
‘empirical research methods/scientific uncertainty’ con-
dition, n = 50 in the ‘empirical research methods/non-
scientific uncertainty’ condition, n = 56 in the ‘non-
empirical research methods/scientific uncertainty condi-
tion,’ and n = 50 participants in the ‘non-empirical re-
search methods/non-scientific uncertainty’ condition.
Uncertainty assessment was then measured with
four items, such as ‘Climate science has not yet suf-
ficiently researched all impacts of climate change on
ocean life.’ Credibility of information (three items as in
Appelman & Sundar, 2016), trust in assertions by climate
scientists (three items, e.g., ‘I trust statements of climate
scientists about the impact of climate change on the
oceans’), and trust in climate science (three items related
to expertise, integrity and benevolence, e.g., ‘I trust cli-
mate science, because I believe that climate scientists
are experts in their field’; adapted from Wissenschaft
im Dialog, 2018) were measured on 5-point Likert scales
(1 ‘I do not agree’ to 5 ‘I agree verymuch’). A furthermea-
sure on epistemic aims is not reported in this article. We
next presented several statements of climate-friendly
behavior, asking participants whether they would do
these in the next month (e.g., ‘use a bike, walk, or use
public transport instead of taking the car,’ using Likert
scales from 1 ‘not likely’ to 5 ‘likely’). Next, we mea-
sured participants’ ease of decision-making to partake
in climate-friendly behavior by asking them to choose
three options from the list and indicate how ready they
were to act on these for a month (from 1 ‘not ready’
to 5 ‘ready’). Certainty in this decision was then mea-
suredwith the two subscales uncertainty and decision ef-
fectiveness of the Decisional Conflict Scale (item 10–16;
Buchholz, Hölzel, Kriston, Simon, & Härter, 2011). We
also asked what could hinder participants from carrying
out these behaviors in the next month (four items, such
as ‘lack of finances’; one optional open-ended item).
Finally, we explained that the texts were fictional and
possibly simplified and asked for participants’ consent to
use their data.
2.2. Statistical Analyses
Using SPSS 25, we conducted analyses of variance
(ANOVA) with two factors: empirical research methods
and scientific uncertainty. For the scales that were ex-
pected to be positively interrelated, we conducted mul-
tivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) to inspect gen-
eral effects and limit the accumulation of Type I errors,
and we followed up with ANOVA for each of the respec-
tive scales and simple effects analyses. For the full report
of results, see the Supplementary File.
2.3. Results
As expected, the degree to which participants perceived
issue uncertainty was higher when uncertainty was in-
cluded in the text (H1): The factor scientific uncertainty
(p < .001, 𝜂2p = .20) was significant, while empirical re-
search methods was not (p = .123; neither was the inter-
action, p = .281).
The texts were perceived to be of similar credibil-
ity (empirical research methods, p = .516; scientific un-
certainty: p = .580; interaction: p = .563). A MANOVA
showed an interaction effect for empirical research
methods and scientific uncertainty on participants’ trust
judgments (p = .007, 𝜂2p = .05), but there was no ev-
idence for a main effect of either empirical research
methods (p = .815) or scientific uncertainty (p = .117).
Separate univariate ANOVAs only showed an interaction
effect for trust in the assertions made by climate scien-
tists (p= .015, 𝜂2p = .03), which we followed up by simple
effects analyses (Bonferroni corrected). These indicated
that trust in assertions ratings were significantly lower in
the ‘empirical research methods/scientific uncertainty’
condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.66) than in the ‘non-
empirical researchmethods/scientific uncertainty’ condi-
tion (M = 4.06, SD = 0.67; F(1,203) = 4.86, p = .029) and
in the ‘empirical research methods/non-scientific uncer-
tainty’ condition (M = 4.11, SD = 0.54; F(1,203) = 6.57,
p = .011). The other two comparisons of experimental
groups did not reach significance (see Supplementary
File). In sum, these results do not support H2 and directly
contradict H3.
Regarding the decision (committing to climate-
friendly behavior), no difference between groups could
be observed (empirical research methods: p = .607;
scientific uncertainty: p = .538; interaction: p = .527).
In contrast to H4, participants’ ease of decision-making
did not differ between the experimental conditions, as
shown by aMANOVAwith both scales as dependent vari-
ables (empirical research methods: p = .801; scientific
uncertainty: p = .431; interaction: p = .183).
2.4. Intermediate Discussion of Study 1
When scientific uncertainty was communicated in the
news article (about the effect of ocean acidification
on ocean life), participants perceived higher issue un-
certainty (confirming H1). However, this experimental
variation did not lead participants to rate the credi-
bility of the information or their trust in climate sci-
ence differently (not supporting H2).When participants
were given information about empirical research meth-
ods in addition to the article entailing scientific uncer-
tainty, they gave lower ratings for trust in climate sci-
entists’ assertions, as compared to experimental con-
ditions in which participants only read the news con-
taining scientific uncertainty but did not read about re-
search processes, or when participants did read about
the research processes and did read the news article,
but the news article contained no scientific uncertainty
(contradicting H3). There was no evidence for an effect
of the experimental variation on participants’ decision
to behave in a climate-friendly way, nor on the ease
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withwhich this decisionwasmade (not supporting H1 in
this regard).
These findings contradict our expectation that giv-
ing participants information about the research meth-
ods would ease their interpretation of uncertainty and,
thus, enhance their trust in climate scientists’ assertions
and in climate science generally. Possibly, as the text ex-
plaining the empirical researchmethods included several
sources of uncertainty (measuring, sampling, andmodel-
ing), participants may have been more skeptical towards
the certainty on which climate scientists’ assertions rest
in general.
3. Study 2
We tested this interpretation in study 2, in which we
varied the text that had, in study 1, explained the em-
pirical research methods. In study 2, participants re-
ceived one of two versions of this text, which described
two separate research processes, namely the empirical
research methods (as in study 1) and the role of ex-
pert consensus in science (described in detail below).
Regardless of the research process being considered, in
the study 2 variations of this text, we either framed
uncertainty in an ‘expected’ way, in which we empha-
sized that the scientific process is intended to increase
certainty, or we framed uncertainty in an ‘exaggerated’
way, where we highlighted the uncertainty that follows
from scientific processes. That is, we tested whether the
framing of scientific uncertainty—either as something in-
herent to science or as something that fundamentally
challenges making reliable conclusions from evidence—
affected participants’ ratings of the article’s credibility,
ratings about trust, and their decision-making surround-
ing the issue. In all conditions of study 2, the news article
text presented the issue (the effect of ocean acidification
on ocean life) as scientifically uncertain (as in study 1’s
scientific uncertainty conditions).
As briefly mentioned above, in addition to the two
conditions of framing uncertainty (‘expected’ vs. ‘exag-
gerated’), we varied the text on research processes to
describe two different types of process, where one con-
dition described the empirical research methods (as in
study 1) and the other described the role of experts find-
ing a consensus in science. Especially around the issue
of climate change, expert consensus finding is argued
to be a central scientific process for achieving certainty
(Oreskes, 2007). Hence, highlighting processes of con-
sensus finding and quality checking among experts (e.g.,
peer review) might help people understand that when
scientific uncertainty exists in a scientific field, it is not be-
cause pertinent scientific experts cannot be trusted (as
might be inferred from the results of study 1). Hence, re-
garding the two conditions for consensus finding, in one
we framed uncertainty in an ‘expected’ way, where we
emphasized that expert consensus plays a pivotal role in
generating reliable scientific knowledge, and in the other
conditionwe framed uncertainty in an ‘exaggerated’ way,
wherewe highlighted the uncertainty that arises from ex-
pert disagreement. Similar variations were made for the
two conditions concerning empirical research methods:
In one condition, we framed uncertainty in an ‘expected’
way, in which we emphasized that empirical scientific
methods are intended to increase certainty, whereas in
the other condition we framed uncertainty in an ‘exag-
gerated’ way (e.g., stating that lab experiments do not
allow for making conclusions about the real world). Our
hypotheses for study 2 are as follows:
H5: When uncertainty is framed in an exaggerated
way, participants give higher ratings for issue un-
certainty and have a lower ease of decision-making
compared to when uncertainty is framed as be-
ing expected (i.e., as part of the scientific process;
main effect).
H6: When uncertainty is framed in an exaggerated
way, participants give lower ratings for information
credibility and trust in climate scientists and climate
science compared to when uncertainty is framed as
being expected (main effect).
Furthermore, to assess individual differences between
participants, we included a measure for epistemic style
(Elphinstone, Farrugia, Critchley, & Eigenberger, 2014).
This inventory measures people’s preferences for infor-
mation processing and problem solving: One scale re-
flects preference for intellective style reasoning (e.g., by
deep reflection on problems), and the other a default
style reasoning (e.g., by finding quick solutions). This
reflects a two-system approach for dealing with uncer-
tainty that has been assumed to be useful for examin-
ing the role of scientific uncertainty in public commu-
nication of science (Patt & Weber, 2014). Since partic-
ipants’ epistemic style might influence their reasoning
about scientific processes and scientific uncertainty, this
may, in turn, also affect their judgments about cred-
ibility and trust. Hence, we investigated (as research
question of the study) whether participants’ epistemic
style influenced their ratings on all dependent variables
that followed the experimental manipulations (covaria-
tion effect).
3.1. Methods
The experimental materials can be found in the
Supplementary File. This study was approved by the au-
thors’ university’s ethics commission (2018-21-FH) prior
to data collection.
3.1.1. Sample
We recruited participants via a university newsletter, re-
sulting in N = 170 who finished the questionnaire and
consented to data use (mobile phone users were not
permitted to take part, but were asked to use a lap-
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top/desktop computer). After excluding those who had
studied at an (applied) university for more than two
semesters and those who were suspected to or had self-
reported as participating in the previous study, we were
left with N = 129 participants. Those participants were
between 18 and 33 years of age (M = 20.73; SD = 2.65,
the entry ‘11’ was recoded as missing), and 56.6% were
female, 39.5%male, and 3.9% chose not to disclose their
gender. Most (42.6%) majored in social sciences, eco-
nomics, or law; 34.1% in science, technology, engineer-
ing emathematics; 17.8% in the arts; the remaining 4.9%
in health, nutrition or sports.
3.1.2. Procedure and Measures
The procedure was similar to study 1. After present-
ing information about participation, we asked partici-
pants demographic questions (age, gender, education).
To increase relevance, students were given a cover story,
namely that participants had to write an argumentation
in a class (e.g., at university), and for that, had to read the
two texts, where one was introduced as a background
text and the other as a newspaper article (no specific
source references were given).
The two textswere as follows: First, participantswere
to read one of four versions of the background text on
research processes. In the condition ‘empirical research
methods/expected uncertainty framing,’ participants re-
ceived a background text that emphasized how exper-
imental studies and modeling are used to achieve reli-
able knowledge in climate science (n = 40; similar to
the empirical researchmethods conditions from study 1).
In the condition ‘expert consensus/expected uncertainty
framing,’ the background text described how experts in
climate science reach consensus (n = 31). In the con-
dition ‘empirical research methods/exaggerated uncer-
tainty framing’ (n= 32) and the condition ‘expert consen-
sus/exaggerated uncertainty framing’ (n = 26), the back-
ground texts described scientific processes by evoking
the uncertainty around evidence or highlighting the dis-
agreement between experts, respectively. All experimen-
tal groups then read the same news article on ocean acid-
ification, similar to the scientific uncertainty text from
study 1. The experimental groups were randomly se-
lected by the survey software.
As in study 1, we measured participants’ assessment
of uncertainty, their perception of information credi-
bility, and their trust in climate scientists/climate sci-
ence. A questionnaire on epistemic aims, and another on
strategies participants use to deal with an informational
problem are not reported.
Regarding decision-making, participants were asked
to make a different decision than in study 1. Imagining
they had to write an argumentation for their class,
they were asked which claim they would support:
‘Impacts of climate change on ocean [life] are…’ (see the
Supplementary File for original item) followed by the op-
tions from 1 ‘not at all grave’ to 5 ‘very grave.’ Two fur-
ther items (see the Supplementary File) measured partic-
ipants’ attitudes toward climate science. Then, epistemic
style was measured with the two scales (intellective
style, default style) of the Epistemic Preference Indicator-
Revised (EPI-R; Elphinstone et al., 2014) on Likert scales
from 1 ‘do not agree at all’ to 5 ‘very much agree’). For
neither scale was a difference between groups observed
(see the Supplementary File).
Finally, we explained that the texts were fictional and
possibly simplified, and then we asked whether partic-
ipants were familiar with the study materials, whether
they had seen news reports on predatory journals,
and whether participants would give us consent to use
their data.
3.2. Statistical Analyses
Using SPSS 25, we conducted analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA) with two factors: the type of research pro-
cesses (TRP: ‘empirical research methods’ and ‘expert
consensus’) and uncertainty framing (UF: ‘expected’
and ‘exaggerated’), using as covariates both scales of
the EPI-R (centered by subtracting the variable sam-
ple mean; Schneider, Avivi-Reich, & Mozuraitis, 2015).
Again, we conducted multivariate analyses of covariance
(MANCOVA) for positively interrelated scales. See the
Supplementary File for full results.
3.3. Results
Contrary to our H5, we found that the degree to which
participants perceived uncertaintywas neither a result of
experimental variation nor influenced by the covariates
(TRP, p = .750; UF, p = .868; interaction p = .331; EPI-R
default style, p = .309; EPI-R intellective style, p = .144).
Regarding H6, results showed that all texts were
perceived to be of similar credibility (TRP, p = .339;
UF, p = .506; interaction p = .350; EPI-R default style,
p = .395; EPI-R intellective style, p = .897). A MANOVA
showed that the experimental variation did not impact
participants’ trust ratings (TRP, p = .503; UF, p = .961; in-
teraction p = .171). However, regarding RQ1, while the
EPI-R sub-scale intellective style did reach significance
as a covariate (p = .010, 𝜂2p = .07), default style did not
(p = .158). Separate univariate ANOVAs showed that in-
tellective style did covary significantly with both trust in
assertions by climate scientists (p = .008, 𝜂2p = .06) and
trust in climate science (p = .004, 𝜂2p = .06).
There was no evidence of an effect of experimental
variations on participants’ decisions (on the gravity of cli-
mate change effects on ocean life) (TRP, p = .934; UF,
p = .932; i n-teraction, p = . 866). The EPI-R sub-scale
intellective style was significant as covariate (p = .006,
𝜂2p = .06), but not default style (p = .906). Contradicting
H5, aMANOVA for ease of decision-making showedno ef-
fects as a result of the experimental variation, but ease of
decision-making did co-vary with intellective style (TRP,
p = .482; UF, p = .154; interaction, p = .073; EPI-R in-
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tellective style, p = .036, 𝜂2p = .05; EPI-R default style,
p = .120). Separate ANCOVAs revealed that the intel-
lective style covariate affected ratings on both scales of
the Decisional Conflict Scale (measuring ease of decision
making), namely the certainty (p = .043, 𝜂2p = .03) and
the effectiveness of the decision (p= .010, 𝜂2p = .05). We
do not interpret further effects in the separate ANCOVAs,
because they were not significant by MANOVA.
3.4. Intermediate Discussion of Study 2
In study 2, we did not find any significant effects that
were due to experimental variations. That is, there was
no evidence that either ascribing the source of uncer-
tainty to empirical research methods vs. expert disagree-
ment, or framing uncertainty as being expected vs. being
exaggerated affected participants’ ratings of perceived
uncertainty and ease of decision-making (counter to H5),
or their assessments of information credibility and trust
(counter to H6). However (regarding the study’s research
question), we found that having an intellective epistemic
style—an appreciation for dealing with complex issues
and engaging in problem solving—was a covariate for
participants’ trust in the assertions of climate scientists
and their trust in climate science, as well as for the deci-
sion (claim support) and ease of decision-making. Thus,
a preference for deep reflection about such issues may
be even more relevant for trust in science and making
decisions about scientific issues than is being exposed to
messages that attack the scientific processes underlying
uncertainty in climate change information.
4. General Discussion
The results of study 1 showed that while the presence
of scientific uncertainty in a text on ocean acidification
led participants to more highly rate the uncertainty of
the issue, it did not cause participants to have more un-
certainty when making a decision related to the issue.
Similarly, this experimental variation did not cause partic-
ipants to give higher rankings on information credibility,
to have greater trust in the assertions made by climate
scientists, or to have greater trust in climate science.
On the contrary, when participants read a text describ-
ing empirical research methods prior to reading the arti-
cle containing scientific uncertainty, they had even less
trust in the assertions made by climate scientists. In con-
trast to what we expected from previous research (e.g.,
Flemming et al., 2020), our study found no evidence that
having participants read texts describing the role of un-
certainty in scientific research would ease how they later
interpreted the scientific uncertainty presented within
the article.
In study 2, we tested whether this effect could be
attributed to the text on empirical research methods,
which introduced several sources of uncertainty and thus
could have resulted in the impression that scientific pro-
cesses in climate science are unreliable. However, the re-
sults of study 2 showed that this seems not to have been
the case: There was no evidence that framing scientific
processes (either empirical research methods or expert
consensus) as the main source of scientific uncertainty
would negatively impact participants’ trust in climate
scientists’ assertions or their trust in climate science.
However, the extent to which participants rated their at-
titude to approaching science-based problems as reflect-
ing an intellective epistemic style did influence their trust
judgments and their decision-making. Hence, how peo-
ple resolve scientific uncertainty might depend more on
individual information processing preferences than on
how scientific uncertainty is framed in news articles.
In sum, our studies indicate that while participants
did perceive the uncertainty introduced in news arti-
cles, this did not affect their decision-making, and it only
slightly influenced their trust: Having information on sci-
entific processes (empirical research methods) in combi-
nation with reading scientific uncertainty in the news ar-
ticle did result in participants having slightly lower trust
in climate scientists’ assertions (e.g., to make meaning-
ful claims about the issue). However, there was no evi-
dence that this would affect participants’ overall trust in
climate science, and neither did framing the scientific un-
certainty in an exaggerated way (both regarding empir-
ical research processes and expert disagreement). This
could be due to participants’ prior knowledge about and
their attitude toward uncertainty in scientific informa-
tion: Participants might have expected scientific results
to be rather uncertain (not due to the text we introduced
with this aim), thus making them unreceptive toward ap-
peals to (sources of) scientific uncertainty.
The effects of scientific uncertainty on trust and be-
havioral intentions are worthwhile to study, as past stud-
ies have differed in their measured concepts (e.g., trust,
emotion, behavioral intentions), and focus (e.g., uncer-
tainty of statistical estimates vs. generalizability of ex-
periments; see van der Bles et al., 2019, 2020). In the
present work, we investigated how scientific uncertainty
is interpreted when people are reminded that scientific
processes act both as the source and as a resolution
for uncertainty. However, the texts we used in the ex-
periments might have been too complex or not rele-
vant enough for participants. Further, each text referred
to several sources of scientific uncertainty. We deemed
this necessary to remind participants that there is fun-
damental scientific uncertainty in climate science but
also that research processes are being continuously op-
timized to approximate ‘truth.’ Further research should
address the field’s yet fragmented understanding on the
communication of uncertainty, making precise distinc-
tions between different types and sources of scientific
uncertainty. As such, further studies should examine con-
sequences of different sources and types of scientific un-
certainty on trust, emotion, and behavior.
Trust is a complex concept, as it can be directed at
the source of knowledge, experts, or science in general.
Our studies addressed only trust in climate science re-
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searchers and trust in the discipline of climate science,
for which we used two small scales. While in our stud-
ies both scales show acceptable internal consistency (see
the Supplementary File), they should be formally tested
for reliability and validity in a larger sample. Further stud-
ies should use more elaborate trust scales to further ex-
amine the effects of scientific uncertainty (in its different
forms) on trust.
Another limitation of our work is that we only ques-
tioned university students. We aimed for a sample that
had little formally acquired procedural knowledge, such
that we excluded participants that had already com-
pleted their first year of university education. The studies
should be replicated with a more diverse sample, as stu-
dents could be generally aware of scientific uncertainty
and might have an accepting attitude toward science.
However, our studies suggest that in a population of stu-
dents who do not yet possess university-level scientific
literacy, adversarial information about scientific uncer-
tainty and its sources might have little to no effect.
5. Conclusion
Our studies add to the literature on the public assessment
of scientific uncertainty, which has produced conflicting
results (van der Bles et al., 2019), and they are relevant to
understanding how readers perceive and interpret scien-
tific uncertainty in digital news media, for example when
it is directed at weakening their trust in science. As a
consequence of uncertainty being used to provoke doubt
about science, uncertainty in climate change communica-
tion has often been linked with adverse responses by re-
cipients (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). Strategic appeals re-
garding science’s inability to achieve reliable resultsmight
be especially prevalent in attacks on climate science in
digital media such as blogs (Elgesem et al., 2015; Mercer,
2018), but also in the context of anti-vaccination, advo-
catesmight use scientific evidence in digitalmedia outlets
to persuade their readers (e.g., Moran, Lucas, Everhart,
Morgan, & Prickett, 2016; Schalkwyk, 2019). Our stud-
ies show that while participants’ trust judgments were
slightly affected by addressed scientific uncertainty in the
two texts (study 1), an exaggeration of scientific uncer-
tainty originating from empirical research or expert con-
sensus did not lead to lower trust judgments than when
uncertainty was presented as being expected (study 2).
However, how scientific uncertainty can be communi-
cated to a more general public should be carefully con-
sidered (Corner, Lewandowsky, Phillips, & Roberts, 2015;
Druckman, 2015).
Especially in user comments, scientific uncertainty
and the credibility of scientific research might be criti-
cally addressed (Lörcher& Taddicken, 2017). In a study in-
vestigating attacks on science in user comments (added
to social media entries introducing a scientific study),
expert user comments targeting thematic complexity
were perceived to be more credible and reduced partic-
ipants’ agreement with a scientific claim, in comparison
with, for example, comments targeting researcher com-
petence (Gierth & Bromme, 2020). Similarly, ‘incivility’
in user comments might polarize readers’ attitudes on
a scientific topic (Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos,
& Ladwig, 2014), and negative user comments on a blog
postmay sour readers’ attitudes toward a scientific topic,
both when comments use scientific arguments or sub-
jective opinions (Winter & Krämer, 2016). In sum, the
mere presence of dissenting user comments might be
effective in reducing reader’s trust in scientific results.
This means that in digital media, science communica-
tors should not only carefully consider the extent and
framing of their communication of uncertainty inherent
in scientific results, but they should also be attentive
of whether user comments challenge science by point-
ing to scientific uncertainty. While our studies did not
find that giving readers information about scientific pro-
cesses effectively reduced negative impacts of uncer-
tainty on trust, this and other communicative strategies
to protect against the utilization of scientific uncertainty
to attack science should be further investigated.
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